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ABSTRACT
This paper studies continuous authentication for touch inter-
face based mobile devices. A Hidden Markov Model (HMM)
based behavioral template training approach is presented,
which does not require training data from other subjects
other than the owner of the mobile. The stroke patterns
of a user are modeled using a continuous left-right HMM.
The approach models the horizontal and vertical scrolling
patterns of a user since these are the basic and mostly used
interactions on a mobile device. The effectiveness of the pro-
posed method is evaluated through extensive experiments
using the Touchalytics database which comprises of touch
data over time. The results show that the performance of
the proposed approach is better than the state-of-the-art
method.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Existing technology typically requires users to authenticate
themselves based on passwords, which have been shown to
be vulnerable to various attacks, including password guess-
ing and eavesdropping ([13, 6]).
Multiple methods were proposed to replace text passwords
with graphical passwords [8, 7, 1, 25, 3, 9]. With the grow-
ing popularity of touch interface based mobile devices, the
touch-surface has become the dominant human-computer in-
terface. This has led to the need for authentication tech-
niques better suited to a touch interface, such as [18, 23].
Research by Sae-Bae et. al [17, 19] showed that users can be
uniquely identified from their multi-touch gestures on multi-
touch devices with high-probability. However, just like text
passwords, graphical and gesture password alternatives au-
thenticate users only at the time of login and they do not
address unauthorized access by an attacker after the user
initially logged on into the device.
In this context, continuous authentication or active authen-
tication [22, 2, 15] mechanisms have emerged as a very
promising approach to alleviate the security problems that
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Figure 1: Spatio-temporal touch patterns of four users
stem from poor authentication technology. Here, instead of
authenticating a user at the time of login, the system contin-
uously monitors aspects of the user behavior biometrics in
order to maintain authentication after login. Some earlier
work on behavior biometrics based continuous authentica-
tion include keystroke dynamics [5, 20], speaking pattern
[26] and device use patterns [12, 14].
Based on touch behavior biometrics, a continuous authen-
tication method has been developed by Frank et. al. [11]
(Touchanalytics). They observed that during a stroke on
the touch screen of the mobile device, the spatio-temporal
pattern (as shown in Figure 1) of fingers along with the area
of touch and pressure is quite distinctive for every person.
They reported high performance when using multiple move-
ments to authenticate the users. Based on this observation
various systems have been developed, like, SenGuard [21],
FAST [10], and SilentSense [4]. Most of them used other
modalities along with touch behavior biometrics, like, mo-
tion, voice, location history, walking pattern, to increase
accuracy.
However, the classifiers (k-Nearest Neighbor, Support Vec-
tor Machine) employed by the above mentioned approaches
including [11] require training data from both the owner as
well as other users for training. Since obtaining training data
from other users is not feasible, an authentication method
that does not need data from other users during training is
desirable.
This paper presents an HMM based algorithm for continuous
authentication on touch devices which serves this purpose.
This research is built on the premise that to implement con-
tinuous authentication in a feasible way, a method which
offers the possibility of being trained with only users data
and can be updated with new data over a period of time is
needed. HMM can be trained and updated with time, and
is also relatively simple and feasible to use, which makes it
a good choice for continuous authentication.
The key contributions of this paper are twofold. First, an
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HMM based behavior model from the owner’s touch infor-
mation is developed. Second, an in-depth analysis of the
proposed method is carried out in different usage scenarios.
The proposed HMM system is tested and compared to the
performance of the Touchanalytics system [11]. The rest of
the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the pro-
posed approach in detail. In Section 3 the extensive experi-
mental results are discussed and finally Section 4 concludes
the paper.
2. PROPOSED APPROACH
The proposed framework works in two steps: training and
authentication. During training, a behavior model is created
based on the horizontal or vertical touch behavior (pressure,
area, duration and position) of a user using HMM. At the
time of authentication, the test observations are compared
with the stored behavior model to establish the identity of
the user.
As mentioned in Section 1, HMM is considered for modeling
the stroke patterns of a subject since it is able to capture the
local dynamic characteristics of a stroke as well as its shape
and length. The touch pattern of a subject is modeled by a
double stochastic process, characterized by a given number
of states each of which is modeled by a mixture of Gaus-
sians. The left-right topology is chosen with no state skip
allowed since it can efficiently describe continuous processes.
HMM allows modeling of temporal variations, where the du-
ration of the state is variable. The states then capture the
transitive properties of the consecutive coordinates of the
stroke. Thus, the state transition matrix represents the dy-
namic properties of the strokes. The state sequence that
maximizes the probability of observing the training strokes
becomes the corresponding model of a subject.
2.1 Training HMM
After normalizing the data set, it is used for training the
HMMs and finding the optimum parameters. As a first step,
the state transition matrix is initialized and the prior prob-
ability matrix by random variables without making any as-
sumptions on the touch patterns. Then, training of HMM
is done from the initial set of strokes of a subject. The opti-
mum number of states and mixtures of an HMM depend on
the complexity and average length of strokes in the training
sequences and their inter-variations. To provide sufficient
evidence to every Gaussian of every state in the training
stage, the number of mixtures times the number of states
should be much smaller than the length of the strokes. The
Baum-Welch algorithm [16] has been employed for estimat-
ing the HMM parameters for each subject. Five-fold cross
validation principle is used to estimate the optimal number
of states and the associated HMM parameters. Since the
parameters yielding the highest likelihood on the validation
set has been chosen, the model conveniently characterizes
the distinct stroke patterns for each subject while avoids
over-fitting.
2.2 Authentication using HMM
Once the behavioral models for all subject classes have been
learned through HMMs, authentication of the subjects can
be performed by computing the log-likelihood of the input
strokes using the Viterbi algorithm [16]. Since the length of
the stroke influences the log-likelihood (the log-likelihood de-
creases exponentially with the increase of the stroke length),
the latter is normalized by the stroke length.
However, since the normalized log-likelihood is length-invariant,
two strokes, one being a part of the other, may produce
similar normalized log-likelihood despite being of different
lengths. So, an additional measure named as stroke kinemat-
ics is introduced. It represents the percentage of time spent
in each state. Since states represent segments of atomic
motions between points of change in motion pattern, the
stroke kinematics captures the detail dynamic properties of
the strokes. The same Viterbi algorithm [16] is used to com-
pute the most likely path. Then, if there are N states in the
claimed identity’s HMM, stroke kinematics is computed as
an N-component vector where the ith component represents
the fraction of time spent in the ith state. Next, the similar-
ity scores derived from the normalized log-likelihood value
and the stroke kinematics for authentication are described.
2.2.1 Similarity Score Computation
Likelihood Score: The likelihood distance Dl between the
normalized log-likelihood of the test stroke Lt and the aver-
age log-likelihood La of the training database is calculated
as: Dl = La−Lt. Then the Likelihood score Sl is computed
as follows: Sl = exp
−Dl
P
, where P is the number of touch
features.
Kinematic Score: The stroke kinematics SKi for each of
the training strokes i are computed beforehand. Then, for
a test stroke, the Euclidean distance Die between its stroke
kinematics (SKt) and all the stroke kinematics of the train-
ing database (Die = ‖SKi − SKt‖∀i) is calculated. Next,
the average of
these distances (D) is computed as: D = 1
M
∑M
i=1D
i
e, where
M is the size of the training data set. This average distance
D is then used to compute the Kinematic Score Sk by an
exponential function: Sk = exp
−D
Q∗N . The normalization
factor Q in the denominator corresponds to the number of
Gaussian mixtures and N is the number of components of
the stroke kinematics.
After getting the two similarity measures (Sl and Sk) of a
test stroke, these two scores are combined by taking simple
arithmetic mean. The combined similarity score (Sc) is used
for final authentication.
2.2.2 Multiple Strokes Fusion
Since authentication using single stroke is highly volatile, to
increase the robustness of the authentication method, mul-
tiple consecutive strokes are used for the final decision. The
average of all the combined similarity scores Sc, obtained
from a sequence of strokes, is employed for this purpose.
3. EXPERIMENTALRESULTSANDDISCUS-
SION
The authentication system is evaluated through calculation
of False Acceptance Rate (FAR) and False Rejection Rate
(FRR). Since these two error rates are inversely related
(lower FAR increases the system security while lower FRR
increases its usability) Equal Error Rate (EER) is also mea-
sured, where FAR is equal to the FRR value.
3.1 Data Set Description
In absence of any other public touch databases, the data
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Table 1: Median EER rates - the newly proposed HMM-
based approach reaches low EER levels for all scenarios
No. Equal Error Rate EER (%)
of Horizontal HMM Scrolling HMM
Strokes Short-
term
Inter-
session
Long-
term
Short-
term
Inter-
session
Long-
term
1 5.35 7.42 9.91 5.63 8.17 8.51
11 0.43 1.88 1.75 0.31 1.53 2.80
set of Frank et al. [11] was chosen for its varied test sce-
narios and realistic nature. Scrolling and horizontal stroke
data sets were collected from 41 subjects using four An-
droid phones with similar specification. More details about
the data set can be found in [11]. Based on this data, exper-
iments were designed to analyze three different application
scenarios with increasing problem difficulty, namely, short-
term, inter-session and long-term authentication. The same
experimental setup was followed to compare this approach
with [11]. The experimental results of the proposed ap-
proach in each of the three situations are described in the
following subsections.
3.2 Short-term or Intra-session Authentication
Short-term authentication is carried out to check whether
the authorized user is actually using the phone after suc-
cessful login. Therefore, authentication is done during the
same session of interaction. The training data set was cre-
ated by randomly drawing data from all available sessions of
the two days and the remaining data were used for testing.
EER Performance: Since training and testing is done in
the same session, authentication in this case is less challeng-
ing. For single stroke, the median EER is found to be 5.35%
for horizontal stroke HMM and 5.63% for scrolling stroke
HMM.
When computing the performance for 11 strokes (similar to
[11]), the EER of the proposed method decreases to 0.43%
and 0.31% for horizontal and scrolling HMMs
respectively (see Table 1).
FAR and FRR Performance: Application where security
is not so much of importance (like
games), low FRR is desired.
When the HMM system FRR is zero, the median FAR is
6.78% using one stroke for scrolling HMM and 7.13% for
horizontal HMM. After observing 11 strokes, the FAR is
reduced to 0.17% and 0.54% for scrolling and horizontal
HMMs, respectively.
This shows that the proposed method is highly secure even
when FRR is zero, i.e. most usable.
For application where high security is required (like bank-
ing), FRR performance of the HMM algorithm is evaluated
keeping zero FAR. For one stroke, the median FRR was
found to be 19.19% for horizontal HMM and 18.28% for
scrolling HMM. The FRR becomes 0.97% after observing 11
strokes for horizontal HMM and 1.65% for scrolling HMM.
The results indicate that in highest security situation (FAR
= 0), the usability of the proposed method is quite high
(<2% FRR).
Figure 2: Error rate variation as a function of the number
of strokes during inter-session authentication
Since training and testing is done in the same session, the
short term test case is more of a ‘proof of concept’ and less
challenging. If the attacker gets hold of the device just after
successful login, the short-term behavior model will be built
from the data of the attacker (since there are no data of the
user in the current session and the short-term model does
not consider owner’s data from previous sessions). Thus, the
attacker will be recognized as the legal one for all further
interactions in that session. Therefore, the short-term clas-
sifier does not depict realistic situation. The inter-session
and long-term or inter-week sessions represent more feasible
scenarios since the owner’s data from previous sessions are
considered during authentication.
3.3 Inter-session Authentication
In inter-session authentication, the user is authenticated across
multiple sessions with a brief time gap. Continuous authen-
tication in such scenario would enable the user to use the
phone seamlessly without unlocking each time after short
burst of activity.
In this case, there was a time gap (of 10-12 minutes) between
the initial training session and the following two testing ses-
sions.
EER Performance: The EER performance variation with
the number of strokes is shown in blue lines in Figure 2.
Using single stroke, the median EER is 8.17% for scrolling
HMMs.
(see Table 1).
The median EER is 1.88% for horizontal and 1.53% for
scrolling HMM. The EER becomes zero after 17 horizontal
or scrolling strokes.
FAR and FRR Performance: The FAR performance of
the proposed approach is shown in green lines Figure 2 while
FRR is zero. For 11 strokes, FAR is 1.83% for scrolling
HMM and 2.33% for horizontal HMM. Similarly, keeping
FAR value zero, the variation of FRR with respect to stroke
number is plotted in magenta lines in Figure 2. After 11
strokes, FRR is found to be 10.00% for scrolling HMM and
3.20% for horizontal HMM.
3.4 Long-term Authentication
Here the training set comprises of the data collected dur-
ing multiple sessions of the first day. Then, testing is done
using the data captured a week later. Thus, long-term au-
thentication tries to evaluate the classifier when the time gap
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Figure 3: Error rate variation as a function of the number
of strokes during long-term authentication
Table 2: Comparative results of the proposed approach
against the Touchanalytics approach using 11 strokes
Touchalytics HMM-based
[11] Approach
Worst
EER(%)
Median
EER(%)
Worst
EER(%)
Median
EER(%)
Short-term 12 ∼0% 5 ∼0%
Inter-session 28 2-3% 12 <2%
Long-term 38 <4% 28 <3%
between the training and testing is quite high. Due to this
time gap, authentication in this case is the most challenging
one.
EER Performance: The EER performance variation with
the number of strokes is shown in blue lines in Figure 3.
For single stroke, the median EER is found to be 9.91% for
horizontal HMM and 8.51% for scrolling HMM. Using 11
strokes, EER decreases to 1.75% for horizontal HMM and
2.8% for the scrolling HMM.
FAR and FRR Performance: The green lines of Figure
3 plot the FAR performance of the proposed approach, while
FRR is zero. For 11 strokes, FAR is found to be 3.39% for
scrolling HMM and 1.96% for horizontal HMM. The FRR
variation with stroke number is plotted in magenta lines in
Figure 3, while FAR is zero. For 11 strokes, FRR is 7.9%
for scrolling HMM and 1.69% for horizontal HMM.
3.5 Performance Comparison
The results of the HMM algorithm are compared to the
Touchanalytics algorithm in all three scenarios, i.e., short-
term, inter-session and long-term, in Table 2. The HMM
algorithm performs better in all the test scenarios than [11].
A special case is the long-term situation, which is the most
challenging one due to one week time gap between train-
ing and testing. Since there are only 14 users’ data for this
study, the HMM algorithm used all of them without classify-
ing any as outliers. Due to the small data set size, using all
14 users’ data is expected to provide more accurate results
and therefore these results are more indicative of the ex-
pected performance. This is in contrast to the Touchanalyt-
ics, which classified the worst 3-5 results as outliers and did
not use them for computing the overall median EER. There-
fore, the results cannot be compared directly (the Touchana-
lytics authentication achieves less than 4% for the long-term
using only the best 9-11 users).
In addition, since the proposed HMM based approach trains
the model based on only the owner’s data, it basically acts
as one class classifier to detect whether the current user is
legitimate or not. On the contrary, all the state-of-the-art
approaches including [11] employ binary classifiers that are
expected to give good results due to use of training data
from the owner as well as other users [4].
Better performance of the proposed approach indicates in-
herent strength of the HMM based behavior model.
4. CONCLUSIONS
This work introduces a new touch behavior modeling ap-
proach using HMM. Since HMM allows automatic continu-
ous training and data updating, it offers significant advan-
tage for continuous authentication. This work is the first
one that uses HMM for continuous authentication based on
mobile-phone user input.
The authentication method is based only on the stroke pat-
terns recorded from the owner’s touch interactions on his
mobile device. Extensive evaluation of the proposed ap-
proach on the
Touchanalytics database has been carried out.
The results of the HMM algorithm were compared to the
Touchanalytics algorithm and found to be superior, without
using any training data from other users. The benefits of
using only the device owner’s data are twofold. First, in
case of personal devices, data from other users may not be
available. Thus, training the classifier with other users’ data
is not possible. Second, authentication results with only
owner’s data reflect the real-life situation in a better way.
This work also looks at the security and the usability of the
proposed approach (i.e., in cases where security is critical
and FAR=0, or when high usability is needed and FRR=0).
The results show that the approach has the potential to
be used for user authentication in continuous and implicit
manner. Future work involves more extensive evaluation
of the approach with a newly generated data set featuring
other types of touch patterns and sensory information.
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